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B reitenbucher, Thomas A., B.A. , 1988 Psychology
An Experiment on the Influence of Structured Instructions 
on Jury Decision Making < 98 pp.)
Director: H.A. Walters, Ph.d
An experiment was conducted to determine if requiring 
jurors to work with structured instructions making them 
decide a case one issue at a time, committing themselves 
to their partial decisions after each is m a d e , would lead 
them to better apply the law. One hundred and fifty-six 
college "jurors" were involved. They were assigned to 
three groups, each group containing nine, six-person 
juries. Four juries were short one member, and one jury 
was short two members due to subjects failing to fulfill 
their experimental commitment. All groups heard an audio 
tape of a civil case involving product liability. One 
group heard a version of the case containing only the 
facts essential to decide the case. The other two groups 
heard a more lengthy presentation of the same case with 
legally irrelevant material added. The case presented was 
designed so that, if the legal instructions were followed, 
the verdict had to be for the defendant. Once they heard 
their version of the case, the juries in each group 
received different instruetions. The group that received 
the stripped down version of the case received 
unstructured legal instructions. One of the groups that 
heard the lengthier case presentation also received 
unstructured instructions. The third group, also hearing 
the lengthier case presentation, received specific 
instructions telling them in what order they must decide 
the legal and factual issues involved. There were no 
statistically significant differences between the groups 
in the patterns of verdicts reached. There were also no 
significant differences in the behavior of the two groups 
hearing the longer case presentation, deliberating under 
structured or unstructured instructions, as measured by 
the confidence they felt in their verdicts nor in their 
evaluation of the evidence. Thus the hypothesis that 
structured instructions could aid in the deliberation of 
complex cases was unsupported. In the discussion of the 
experiment possible interpretations of negative results 
and questions for future research are considered.
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
An experiraent was conducted to determine if giving more 
structured instructions to jurors might improve the 
quality of their deliberations. In order to provide a 
context for this problem a brief review of relevant 
findings in the following areas is in order : 1) the
history of legal psychology and jury research, 2) evidence 
concerning the ability of jurors to accomplish the task 
which the law requires, 3) research findings of cognitive 
psychology in the areas of problem solving, expert 
decision making, memory, confirmation bias, group 
polarization, and information integration theory, 4) a 
brief consideration of some problems of external validity 
in jury simulations. 
h i s t o r y  OF LEGAL RESEARCH
There is a long history of psychological research into 
legal issues, beginning with Muensterberg*s controversial 
book On the kLiiJQiLSS St and (1908). In that book he 
attempted to directly apply the principles of experimental 
psychology to the problems of law. To say that officers of 
the court were not impressed would be an understatement. 
The heart of Anglo American jurisprudence is precedent,
1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2
and any suggestion that things might be done differently 
because that would be more "scientif ic" has not been 
welcomed from the legal community. R o b i n s o n ’s b o o k , Law 
and Lawyers <1935), which attempted by a slightly 
different route than Muensterberg, to reduce the problems 
of law to the problems and methods of psychology again 
contributed less light than heat. Yet R o b i n s o n ’s 
acknowledgement that it was not possible to simply apply 
existing laboratory findings to questions of law, was a 
step toward making a fruitful col 1aboration between the 
legal system and experimental psychology possible. 
Robinson acknowledged that psychology of law must be an 
applied psychology, not just an extension of general 
psychological laws to a new domain.
In the past lawyers and psychologists have tended to 
ignore one another (Fahr, 1961). The lawyers often
believed that the laboratory research cited was of dubious 
application to the more complex milieu of the courtroom 
(Loh, 1981). The psychologists were puzzled at the 
indifference and hostility to their attempts to reform and 
improve the operation of the law. It is only since the 
beginning of the 1970s that experimental research in 
psychology and the law has become vigorous once again, 
following a long fallow period from the 1920s onward 
(Wei Is, 1984). T a p p ’s Law. Just ice and the Individual i n
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
S o ç i ^ i l l  P s > i ç h D i D 3 i ç a i  and Legal issues (1977) , marks a
turning point and "coming of age" in the relationship 
between lawyers and psychologists, marked by a greater 
sensitivity on the part of psychologists to the specific 
needs and point of view of those in the legal system (Loh, 
1931).There is speculation, but no definite answer as to 
why experimental psychologists have become interested in 
the law once again (Wells & Loftus, 1984). The last ten 
years have seen a great increase in the growth of legal 
psychology with an emphasis on the part of psychologists 
on practical and applied w o r k . At the same time lawyers 
"have grudgingly begun to believe that psychologists can 
make a practical contribution to the legal process" 
(Konecni and Ebeson, 1978, p. 39)
The Abiiitii of Jurors to A ç ç o m B Ü s h  Their Task
There has a been a great deal of research on jury 
behavior since Muensterberg first pioneered the 
application of psychology to problems of law. A number of 
relatively recent reviews have attempted to consider and 
weigh the various strands of inquiry ( G e r basi, Zuckerman, 
and Reis, 1977; Saks and Hast ie, 1978; N e m e t h , 1981 ;
Monahan and Loftus, 1982 ) One of the most active areas of 
inquiry has been an examination of factors affecting jury 
deliberations, and whether in fact it can be presumed that 
the average juror is capable of performing the task which
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the 1 aw expects. A juror takes an oath to decide a case 
upon the law and the evidence presented in court. His 
personal opinions or sense of what the law should be are 
considered legally irrelevant. While this may be what the 
law demands, many researchers have been led to ask what 
empirical foundations there may be for the belief that 
this is possible, let alone u s u a l . Kalven and Zeisel
found that judges and juries disagreed on verdicts in
approximately 20% of cases (1966). There are two major 
areas of concern here. One is the question of how 
prejudice and personality traits might affect trial 
outcomes. The second concerns the question of how well 
jurors apply the law. As we shall see the two questions in 
practice c a n ’t be very easily separated. One question is 
almost the mirror image of the other. When jurors are not 
applying the law they may be assumed to be applying their 
biases.
A major function of the judge is to interpret the law. 
The task of the jury is to determine the facts and apply 
the law. Yet there is a great deal of evidence that the 
jury does not always follow the law as set down by the
judge. Sometimes they d o n ’t understand the law. Hervey
(1947) found after examining questionaries returned by 185 
jurors that 40% had not understood the j u d g e ’s 
instructions. Strawn and Buchanan (1976) found that only
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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50% of simulated jurors understood that the defendant did 
not have to prove that he was innocent. Overall, subjects 
in the Strawn and Buchanan study showed an average of 
only 70% comprehension when tested on their knowledge of 
standard legal instruetions, immediately after being given 
them. A study by E 1 w o r k , Sales and Alfini (1977) found 
that juror comprehension and memory for the standard legal 
instructions were as effective in conveying legal concepts 
as receiving no instructions at all. Simon (1967) in her 
study of the insanity defense found that of twelve mock 
juries asked to consider a case using the M ’Naghten rule, 
only eight formally considered the d efendant’s ability to 
tell right from wrong, though that is a crucial part of 
the rule. McGlynn and Dreilinger (1981) found evidence 
that a jury will tend to consider a defendant less insane 
the more serious the crime, when an insanity plea is 
entered. H o w e v e r , this is directly contrary to the demands 
of the law.
Sometimes jurors seem to prefer their own version of the 
law. Kalven and Zeisel (1966) concluded that the 
modification of the law to conform to what the jury 
believed it ought to be, was a factor in 50% of the 
disagreements about verdicts between judge and jury. The 
authors go on to outline such matters as self-defense, 
contributory fault and liability damages as areas where
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
juries of ten follow their own version of the law
Monahan and Loftus (1982) cite a number of factors which 
have been investigated as possible sources of bias in jury 
deliberations: these include defendant characteristics,
juror personality, the joining of issues in a single trial 
and procedural rules.
A question of great current interest is whether a jury 
can be expected to understand the issues, and apply the 
laws which are part of contemporary complex civil
litigation (Austin, 1984). As law becomes more complex, in 
reflection of the increasing complexity of society itself, 
it may well be asked whether it is reasonable to expect 
the average person to be able to comprehend and deal with 
such complexity when called upon for jury d u t y . Former 
Chief Justice Burger (1982) has written, "It borders on
cruelty to draft people to sit for long periods trying to 
cope with issues largely beyond their g r a s p " (p. 21). As
Kalven (1964) states, many doubts have been expressed
about the possibility of reliable fact-finding by, " 12
persons brought in from the street, selected in various 
w a y s , for their lack of general ability..." (p. 1068). The
Third Circuit Court ruled in 1980 that, " due process
precludes trial by jury when a jury is unable to perform 
Cits] task with a reasonable understanding of the evidence 
and legal r u l e s . " (Austin, 1984, p.l) The Ninth Circuit
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Court, however, refused to accept the possibility of there 
ever being a case "so overwhelmingly complex that it is 
beyond the abilities of a j u r y . " (Austin, 1984, p.l)
Despite the obvious practical and constitutional 
importance of this issue, and although there has been a 
great deal of research in various aspects of jury 
behavior, there has been a paucity of empirical research 
on jury comprehension. There has not on 1 y been relatively 
little research into jury comprehension, there has been 
even less research into ways of improving the ability of 
a jury to apply the instructions received from the b e n c h . 
(Severance & Loftus, 1982).
The focus of this experiment was to determine if more 
structured instructions from the bench might lead to more 
accurate application of the law. The idea for the 
experiment came from the Sharon libel case against Time 
magazine. In that case the judge directed the jury to 
consider the three legal elements necessary for libel one 
at a time. The jury had to decide: was the Time story
untrue, was it damaging to the reputation of Sharon, and 
was Tiroe either malicious or careless in publishing it. 
The jury had to announce its decisions publicly after each 
was made. Considering the fact that a number of jurors in 
their public statements after the trial expressed distaste 
for lime magazine's c o n d u c t , the ultimate verdict of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8
acquittai is remarkable though in good conformance with 
the law. In the February 4th issue of T ime. Floyd Abrams, 
a New York lawyer who specializes in First Amendment 
cases is quoted as saying of the case, "Here the jury 
distinguished between a mistake and a lie. Most juries 
have not been able to do that, and consequently we have a 
75% reversal rate of verdicts for the plaintiff on a p p e a l " 
(p . 66).
The outcome of the Sharon trial brought to mind three 
related elements in the research literature. First, the 
j u d g e ’s instructions to the jury can be a crucial element 
in the outcome of a trial. Oros and Elman demonstrated 
the crucial effect the j u d g e ’s instructions to the jury 
can have in rape trials C1979).
Second, there is also some evidence that jurors are most 
likely to be guided by their personal biases and opinions 
when the evidence is ambiguous (Kap1 an and Miller, 1978). 
In another study Kaplan and Miller state, "our research on 
trait biases suggest that when evidence is ambiguous or of 
questionable reliability, biases remain operative" (1974, 
p.52). An analogous result was reported by Sue, Smith and 
Caldwell who found that when the remaining evidence is 
weak, jurors will disregard the j u d g e ’s instructions and 
be influenced by inadmissible evidence (1973). It seems as 
if in a state of uncertainty the jury will use whatever
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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in-formation comes to hand. In S i m o n ’s book on the insanity 
plea she records long wandering discussions in the jury 
room as one juror af ter another related personal
experiences, stories and recollections as they attempted 
to come to grips with what was meant by the difficult and 
somewhat obscure concept of legal insanity. While this is 
understandable, it is not what the law envisions jury 
deliberations should be. It seems reasonable that any 
procedures that can be invented to make the structure of 
evidence and law clearer, would aid in deliberations.
There is a third element of the research literature
which the Sharon case brings to attention. There is
evidence that jurors have trouble separating issues and 
evidence when there are several issues at stake in a 
trial. When several criminal offenses are joined in a 
trial, exper imentat i on has shown that ratings of the 
d e f e n d a n t ’s guilt are higher than when offenses are tried 
separately ( Horowitz, Borden and Feldman, 1980» Tanford 
and P e n r o d , 1982). There is support for the hypothesis
that one of the reasons for this phenomenon is that
evidence relevant to one charge may be connected with 
another offense (Tanford and Penrod, 1982» Tanford, 1985).
It also appears that there is a tendency to remember only 
evidence relevant to the verdict preferred by a juror 
(Greene, 1981).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The apparent success of the j u d g e ’s instructions in the 
Sharon case, in aiding the jury in their complex 
deliberations, leads to the question of whether similar 
instructions might be helpful in reducing ambiguity, and 
aiding the separation of issues in other types of civil 
c a s e s . There is considerable ambiguity at the end of any 
trial. A great deal of evidence will have been presented 
that must be integrated by the jury. One of the most 
important tasks of the jury is to extract relevant 
information from very complex and confused context (Ebeson 
& Konecni, 1980, Gerbasi, Zuckerman & Reis, 1977). It 
seems possible that a set of instructions that would focus 
the case on specific issues, demanding that they be 
decided one at a time, would serve to reduce the amount of 
ambiguity perceived by the jury and thus the amount of 
bias in applying the law.
Relevant Findings of Cognitive P ^ c h o l g g y
Some of the findings of cognitive psychology, though not 
directly applicable to the problem set out here, offer a 
good deal that is suggestive. Much research has been 
devoted to the study of how people solve well defined 
problems with clearly specified goals. The j u r y ’s task is 
not a well defined problem (Reitman, 1964). Unlike a chess 
problem, neither the initial state of affairs ( the 
validity of the evidence) nor the procedures by which the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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verdict must be reached are precisely specified. The goal 
is to determine whether there is enough evidence to meet 
the legal criteria offered in the judicial instructions. 
Ill defined problems are generally more difficult to solve 
than well defined ones ( Chi and Glasser, 1985).
Newell and S i m o n ’s (1972) classic work tries to set out 
the universal elements of problem solution. First one must 
recognize the task environment: the terms in which the
problem is p r e s e n t e d . This may consists of words, symbols, 
meanings or objects. Second, one must transform that 
information into a problem space: a mental représentât ion
of the t a s k . The problem space is o n e ’s interpretation of 
the initial s t a t e , the goal and the acceptable means to 
attain the end. Once the problem space is defined one 
relies on information in memory to assess whether or not 
various possible steps can bring one closer to the desired 
goal. One can conceive of the initial state of the j u r y ’s 
problem as being the evidence and the law to be applied. 
The jury must sort through the evidence, finding the 
information relevant to each part of the law, weigh that 
evidence, and come to a decision as to whether the 
criteria of the law have been met. At its simplest, the 
j u r y ’s task is rather like a logic problem where the task 
is to sort through a great deal of relevant and irrelevant 
information to determine if there is sufficient relevant
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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in-formation to make a certain in-ference. The j u r o r ’s 
prejudices and intuitions might be considered simply 
another form of irrelevant information which must be
sorted through.
In a real court case the j u r o r ’s task is complicated by 
the fact that the truthfulness of the evidence presented 
can not be taken for granted. The juror must make an 
assessment of the probability of the testimony he hears.
The question of how people assess probabilities is a 
complex one, though the errors that are made are often of 
systematic and predictable types ( Lichtenstein, Slovic, 
Fischoff, Layman & Combs, 1978). For the sake of 
simplicity, the present study will focus on the question 
of how the cognitive process of sorting relevant 
information and applying it might be enhanced. It seems 
plausible that an assessment of probabilities must rest on 
the ability to extract and apply relevant information.
Information gained about cognitive processes might be 
relevant to future research into the larger question of
how jurors establish the credibility of evidence.
The function of structured jury instructions might be
seen as that of offering to the juror the problem solving 
heuristic which Newell and Simon (1972) suggest, of 
creating subgoals. The structured instructions divide the 
j u r y ’s work into a series of s u b t a s k s , which are more
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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e a s i1y m a n a g e d .
In a series of studies, Voss and his colleagues 
attempted to discover how people go about solving ill 
defined problems (Voss, Greene, P o s t , & Renner, 1983;
V o s s , Tyler and Yengo, 1983 ). Their work seems to 
indicate that people usually try to solve ill defined 
problems by breaking them down into smaller more 
manageable subproblems. This process is precisely what 
the structured jury instructions considered in this study 
attempted to aid.
The analogy between the jury process and conventional 
problem solving tasks is not entirely satisfactory, 
however. Since neither the initial state, the permissible 
moves to the g o a l , nor the goal itself are precisely 
defined, the analogy is somewhat strained. A better 
paradigm might be found in considering the work that has 
been done in examining the formation and application of 
expert knowledge. The j u r o r ’s task is rather like that of 
a doctor, who examines a patient presenting a variety of 
s y m p t o m s . The physician must decide which of the many 
things he observes and is told are relevant. Some 
physicians are far better at diagnosis than others. What 
is the difference between an expert, a beginner or a 
bungler? According to Larkin and Reif (1979) the answer 
seems to be that the knowledge of an expert is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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hierarchically organized. That is, expert knowledge 
logically organizes details and phenomena into logically 
grouped chunks.
Paul J o h nson’s study of expert knowledge has found that 
among other things, the expert has a "high altitude 
overview." He goes on to s a y , "Highly expert people have 
an enormously efficient picture of what they are trying to 
do- they see things in perspective so they know just what 
additional information they need. The less expert 
individual collects a great deal of unnecessary data,
because he d o e s n ’t know what he needs to know." ( Hunt,
1982, p.264)
Chi, Glasser and Rees (1982), in a study of how experts 
and novices in physics classify problems found that 
novices were more influenced by the appearance of a
problem than the physical principles involved. This would 
seem to indicate that one of the things experts are able 
to do, which makes their judgments more accurate, is see 
beneath the superficial features of a problem. It seems
plausible that what structured instructions do is help 
organize information into c h u n k s , helping the jurors get 
at the underlying principles of the case. When judicial 
instructions are unstructured, they are simply additional 
pieces of information to be sorted out. They may not 
necessarily aid in organizing the legal problem into the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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most ef-ficient and accurate structure.
It is relevant here to recall research done on memory 
retrieval. Bartlett (1932) contended that storage and 
retrieval of verbal information is "effort after meaning." 
That is, people do not remember, after a relatively brief 
interval, exactly what they have read or heard, but what 
they perceive to be its meaning. These findings were 
confirmed by several researchers testing the ability of 
subjects to exactly recall sentences (S a c h s , 1967; McKoon,
1977; Anderson and Paulson, 1977). What the subject 
recalls is not the literal order of words, but the meaning 
of a sentence.
But the fact that we recall what we believe is 
meaningful implies that our present beliefs about the 
material to be recalled can affect what we remember. 
Snyder and Uranowitz (1978) and Halpern (1984) have 
conducted research on the effect of stereotypes on memory, 
finding that, as Halpern expressed it, "It seems that it 
is our memories that change while the stereotype resists 
change" ( p.252). Likewise, the legal system has come to 
recognize that the testimony of eyewitnesses is very often 
tainted by what the witness has learned after the event 
(Loftus, 1975; Loftus, Miller & Burns, 1978). The 
implication would seem to be that how one conceives of a 
case in the present can affect what is remembered about
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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it. Changing the structure of jury instructions might well 
affect the conception of the case as it is being
deliberated, and this could certainly affect what is 
remembered. What is remembered must certainly have an 
affect on the outcome of deliberations.
A common fallacy of thought, even where all information 
necessary to make a decision is present and readily 
available is to fail to consider, and thus ignore,
d i sconf i rmi ng information. Studies by Smedlund (1963) and 
Wason (1960, 1968) have demonstrated that confirmation
bias is a prevalent fallacy of everyday reasoning. The 
phenomenon has even been demonstrated in NASA scientists 
(Hynatt, Doherty, He Tweney, 1978). Yet work by Janis and 
Mann (1977) suggests that poor decisions are often the
result of failure to think through all relevant
considérât ions.
The research on confirmation bias would lead one to 
predict that members of a jury will seek to marshal 
evidence that confirms their initial impression of the 
case rather than seeking systematically to determine
whether their impression is warranted by the evidence.
There is evidence that the j u r y ’s eventual decision often
is in the direction of the initial vote and that
discussion tends to make those initially in favor of a 
position, more strongly in favor after deliberation
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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(Kalven & Zeisel, 1966» Davis, 1973; Meyers and Kaplan,
1976; Kaplan and Schersching, 1981) . This is a special
case of the phenomenon of group polarization ( Cartwright, 
1973; Lamm & Myers 1978).
There is a great deal of evidence that the tendency of a 
jury to move in the direction of the majority opinion is 
largely affected by the majority producing proportionate1 y 
more evidence and argument to support their opinion
(Kaplan, 1984; Kaplan & Miller, 1983: Lamm & Myers, ! 978,
Stasser, Stella, Hanna, & C o l e 11a, 1984). It might be 
theorized that the effect of this accumulation of
supportive evidence is to produce an impression of a 
thorough examination of the issues and overwhelming 
agreement of the case evidence. The effect of confirmation 
bias thus is cumulative and pushes the jury toward
unanimity in the direction of the majority view.
Structured instructions, by forcing consideration of each 
of the relevant legal issues, one at a time, works against 
confirmation bias. The procedure is in the spirit of the
recommendation of Stasser et al. (1984) that j ury
deliberation be structured to "procedurally compensate for 
the advantage of the majority by encouraging an unbiased 
review of evidence"(p. 125). Structured instructions
assure that all of the issues are systematically 
deliberated. Confirmation bias would lead one to expect
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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that iri unstructured deliberations only those issues that 
are favorable to the majority opinion will be considered.
Information integration theory postulates that evidence 
has both scale and weight (Anderson, 1976» Kaplan & 
Miller, 1979). Scale refers to the importance of the
evidence in terms of the judgment to be made. If the
defendant is an expert m a r k s m a n , that would have high 
scale value if he is charged with shooting his rich uncle. 
If he was in another county when the shooting occurred, 
the scale value would be low. Weight refers to the
importance of the information in making the particular 
judgment. One would hope that the fact that the defendant 
has an honest face would have less weight th a n , for
instance, the fact that he was at the scene of the crime.
In a typical court case, the content of testimony 
provides scale values, while its credibility and relevance 
to the verdict affect its weight. Each piece of
information is integrated into the final decision in a 
kind of weighted average. As Kaplan and Miller note, "the 
most interesting property of the weighted average form is 
that the weighting is relative: as the weighting of one
element decreases...the weight of the other elements will 
increase" ( p. 56).
One might postulate that one of the things that might 
happen in giving a jury structured instructions is that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the weight of various elements of the evidence would 
shift. In focusing jury discussion down to several 
specific issues to be decided in sequence, the jury would 
be led to see the relevance of the evidence to the law 
more clearly. Thus the evidence would have more weight. 
And there would be less need for the members to draw on 
folklore and personal experience to resolve the 
ambiguities of the case.
External V a lid i tv of Individual Measures in Jury Research
The question of whether one should test hypotheses 
concerning jury behavior by measuring the responses of 
individuals, or whether only the collective responses of 
groups should be used, is controversial. Erlanger has 
argued there seems to be little need or justification at 
this point for simulated studies using individuals to 
decide cases (1970). The use of individuals rather than 
groups in simulations has come under a fair amount of 
criticism ( Konecni and Ebbsen, 1980» Bermant, McGuire, 
McKinley, & Salo, 1974). The methods which Strodtbeck used 
in the 50s, gaining cooperation with the courts, using 
members from the jury pool, who acted as a jury in an 
actual court setting, seem ideal.(Strodtbeck, James, & 
Hawk i ns, 1957).
However, Bray and Kerr (1979) note, "The difficulty and 
cost of carrying out highly realistic simulations is
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simply prohibitive for many investigators’* ( p. 108). And 
thus in their review of current research they found that 
70% of the 72 studies reviewed, took place in the 
laboratory. In the instance of the present study it would 
be nearly impossible to convene over 150 juries of 6 
persons each in realistic trial settings in order to 
determine if there is a significant difference in trial 
outcomes through the use of structured instruct ions.
This controversy represents a considerable dilemma for 
the jury researcher. On the one hand it seems compelling, 
since the jury represents a group process, to use 
experimental procedures which involve presenting cases to 
groups and having them deliberate to a result. The measure 
used then would be the difference in number of verdicts 
pro and con produced between one experimental condition 
and another. But if the unit of observation is the group, 
and the measure is "guilty or not", then one must 
essentially multiply the number of subjects needed by the 
number of members in the jury. If 150 observational units 
are needed to test a hypothesis, and there are six persons 
to a jury, then 900 subjects are needed.
The alternative procedure used in jury research is to 
present case materials to individuals and have them come 
to a conclusion without deliberation. This procedure is 
efficient in time and numbers of subjects required, but it
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obviously ignores the element of group process in jury
deliberat ions.
The method used in this study represents a compromise 
which implements procedures from both approaches. Case 
materials were presented to mock jurys and they
deliberated for a period of time under no requirement to
come to a unanimous verdict. At the end of that time 
individual jurors were polled for a verdict and the jurors 
were surveyed for their reaction to the case materials. 
The statistical analysis of results maintained the group 
as the unit of analysis. That is, individual yea and nea 
votes were not simply pooled and compared between 
conditions, but an analysis of variance was conducted
using each mock jury as the unit of observation. 
Individual verdicts were expressed as a fraction of total 
voting for the plaintiff over total jury members, and 
rated evaluations of the importance of evidence were 
averaged for each jury and those averages were compared by 
one way analysis of variance across the experimental 
cond i t i ons.
It can be reasonably argued that in areas of inquiry 
where there has been relatively little research, such as 
the effect of j u d g e ’s instructions, there still is a point 
in doing research where single individuals, after a period 
of deliberation, are asked to render a verdict. Such
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studies can give some idea of how useful it might be to 
attempt to further study under more realistic conditions. 
If individuals deliberating with structured instructions 
come to significantly different conclusions than 
individuals who do not, then it would be plausible to look 
for similar differences in groups operating under 
conditions more like those of an actual trial. The finding 
of no significance does not rule out a possible 
significant effect with actual juries, nor does the 
finding of differences in individuals guarantee that such 
differences will be found in groups. Nevertheless, the 
extremely large numbers involved in working with mock 
juries, where each group counts as a single subject, might 
argue for initially examining individual responses to try 
to get a rough measure of the magnitude of the effect to 
be expected.
There is empirical support for this procedure in the 
findings of Kalven and Zeisel (1966) that 9 out of 10 
juries reached the verdict favored by the majority on the 
first ballot. Several mock trial studies have found that 
proportionate strength of the majority position was a good 
predictor of the eventual outcome ( Davis, 1973» Davis, 
Kerr, Stasser, Meek, & Holt, 1977; Kerr, N e r e n z , Herrick, 
1979 )
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Summary of Expérimentai Hvpothesis 
The purpose of the study t h e n , was to examine the
question of whether or not structured instructions would 
aid jurors in accurately applying the law to complex 
c a s e s . If a group of jurors deliberating with structured 
instructions is, on average, more successful in applying 
the law to a complex case and in separating out relevant 
from irrelevant evidence than jurors working with
unstructured instructions, this would provide support for 
the hypothesis that structured instructions contribute to 
accuracy of the jury process.
If the groups receiving structured instructions
perform in a way that is not statistically different from 
groups rece i V i ng unstruetured i nstructions, then the 
hypothesis that structured instructions are useful in
helping jurors accurately perform their duties is
unsupported.
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METHOD
S u b i e ç t s
A total o-f 156 subjects, 76 males and SO females,
drawn +rom the introductory psychology course at the
University of Montana, participated in the experiment.
They participated as part of a course requirement. No mock
jury was composed exclusively of males or females.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three
experimental cells. In the first, 52 subjects (25males
and 27 females in seven groups of 6 and two groups of 5)
comprised the condition hearing a shortened version of a
product liability c a s e . This will be referred to
henceforth as the short cell. In the second experimental
cell, 53 subjects < 26 males and 27 females in eight
groups of 6 and one of 5) participated in the condition
which deliberated under unstructured instructions. This
will be referred to as the unstructured cell. In the
third, 51 subjects deliberated under structured
instructions. This third set was composed of 25 males and
26 females divided among seven groups of 6, one of 5 and
one group of 4. These groups will henceforth be referred
to as the structured cell. The reason why 5 juries were
short a member and one was short two members was that some
subjects did not fulfill their commitment to participate
24
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in the experiment. As the unit of observation was the 
group, the shortfall of these members was not judged to be 
a serious problem.
A&paratus
An audio taped mock trial was used, so constructed that 
a verdict for the defendant was logically required if the 
legal principles given in the judicial instructions were 
accurately applied to the case. The case involved product 
liability (See Appendix A for the trial transcript). The 
trial tape came in two versions. One version contained 
only the logically essential elements of the case (see 
Appendix B ) . In this version there was only a single 
argument and counterargument for each of the three major 
issues to be decided. F u r t h e r , the p l a i n t i f f ’s injuries 
and reverses, were covered in two short statements rather 
than being presented at length. A lengthier version of the 
case (see Appendix A) presented to juries in two 
experimental cells forced the jurors to sort through a 
great deal of information, much of which was not relevant 
to the legal issues to be decided, in order to come to a 
verd ict.
Procedure
One hundred and sixty two subjects heard an audio taped 
civil trial involving the product liability case described 
above (See Appendices A and B ) . There were three
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experimental cells each consisting of 9 juries < 1 jury 
had four members, 5 had five members and 23 had six 
m e m b e r s ) . Each jury heard the audio taped case material 
and discussed it for 20 minutes. At the end of that time 
each juror voted on the verdict to be handed d o w n . There 
were two different sets of instructions directing the 
jurors in how they were to proceed with their 
deliberations.
The arrangement of case types and instruction types 
among the three groups can be diagrammed as follows:
I. SHORT II. UNSTRUCTURED III. STRUCTURED




The short cell heard the stripped down version of the 
case. For this group the task of sifting through the 
conflicting claims of the case, to get to the core of 
information necessary to decide the legal issue was done 
for them. The purpose of this group was to provide a 
baseline against which the the behavior of the other two 
groups could be judged. It was predicted that the pattern 
of verdicts and the way in which evidence was evaluated 
would be most similar between this group and the 
structured condition, thus providing further evidence that 
the structured instructions aided the jurors in getting to
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the heart of the legal issues. It was expected that 
providing structure would, in e f f e c t , act in much the same 
way as decreasing the quantity of information that must be 
c o n s idered.
The structured cell heard an expanded version of the
case (see Appendix A) In deliberating the case they 
received structured instructions, telling them in what 
order to decide the legal issues one by one. After they 
made each decision they were required to mark a jury 
ballot before they could go on to decide the next issue. 
It was hoped that the process of formally narrowing the 
discussion of issues, by means of structured instructions 
would aid the jurors in finding and using the relevant 
information in the case materials.
The third group heard the same case materials as the
second group. They, however, were not told in what order 
to decide the issues involved during their deliberations. 
They were simply told the law, the legal issues to be 
determined and left to their own devices as to how to
apply the law to the facts. This is, in fact, closely
similar to typical courtroom procedure.
MEASURES
There were three types of measures used to examine 
differences in group behavior. The measures were: 1)
differences in verdicts arrived at, 2) confidence in the
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verdict and 3) evaluation of the evidence.
The first measure was of the differences in verdicts 
among the three experimental conditions. The verdict 
arrived at in each group was expressed as a fraction i.e., 
the total voting for the plaintiff over the total number 
of individuals in the group. The reason why the verdicts 
were expressed in this way rather than pooling together 
the total number of votes for the plaintiff and comparing 
those totals across the three experimental conditions, was 
that the unit of measurement in this experiment was the 
group rather than the individual. A jury is not simply an 
aggregate of individuals. The juror works in a group to 
come to a decision and the group process will greatly 
influence him or her. The individual’s predilections, 
prejudices and his willingness to act on them will be 
modified to some degree by the others in the group. Thus 
it seemed inappropriate to statistically examine the data 
from this experiment as if one were dealing with the 
behavior of 156 unconnected individuals. Each one of those 
individuals was part of a particular group and their 
behavior may have been different if they had been attached 
to some other g r o u p . The statistical procedures used must 
necessarily reflect that fact. The experiment was 
concerned with examining the behavior of 27 groups rather 
than 156 individuals.
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In that not all groups had equal numbers of subjects, 
the best way to reflect that fact was to express the 
behavior of each group as a fraction which divided those 
voting for the plaintiff over the total number in the 
g r o u p . The alternative of simply using the total votes for 
the plaintiff in each Jury as the measure of their result 
would lose the information about unequal group sizes. Five 
votes for a plaintiff in a group of five means something 
different than five votes out of a group of six.
The second measure, the confidence that jury members had 
in their verdicts was assessed on a five point LiUert 
scale where response possibilities ranged from "extremely 
confident" to "not very confident" (see Appendix F )
The third measure in the experiment, that of differences 
in evaluation of the evidence, was done by having each 
juror fill out a questionarie which listed each piece of 
evidence and asked them to evaluate on a 5 point Likert 
scale how important each was in arriving at their verdict 
(see appendices D and E). The responses on the 
quest ionai res were then analyzed in the following fashion: 
first, evidence was divided into two major categorie s : 
that which was legally relevant and that which was legally 
irrelevant. The irrelevant evidence consisted of 
information about the seriousness of the plai n t i f f ’s 
injuries and his financial reverses. This evidence is
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defined as "irrelevant*' because, as the case was
constructed, it had no bearing on the legal issues to be
decided. That the plaintiff was injured was not contested.
That he suffered was not in dispute. What was at issue,
was who was responsible for the injuries and why.
Information about the p l a i n t i f f ’s suffering was designed 
to sway the j u r y ’s emotions, but it had no bearing on the 
technical legal issues.
Legally "relevant" information was so defined because it 
had bearing on the three legal issues that had to be
decided. The category of relevant evidence was divided 
into three major categories, each having two 
subcategories. The first category (A) comprised evidence 
germane to the issue of legal responsibility. Its 
subcategories were (1) evidence supporting legal
responsibility and (2) evidence diminishing legal
r e s p o n s i b i 1ity . The second category (B), comprised
evidence germane to the issues of whether there was a
defect in the product. Its subcategories were (1) evidence
supporting the existence of a defect and, <2) evidence
against the existence of a defect. The third category (C),
comprised evidence germane to the issue of whether the 
defect caused the accident. Its subcategories were (1) 
evidence supporting the claim that a defect caused the 
accident and (2) evidence counter to that claim.
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS
Given that the major thrust of the experiment was the 
comparison of the effect of structured instructions on 
jury deliberation an initial comparison was conducted 
between the structured and unstructured groups on each 
measure to estimate the probability that the two cells 
had a different population m e a n . Whatever other patterns 
there might be in the data, the absence of significant 
differences between these two groups render that data 
equivocal and difficult to interpret. That comparison thus 
must be the foundation of analysis. As the F and t tests 
are equivalent when there is only one degree of freedom, 
the F statistic was used as a matter of convenience in 
analyzing the data. There was no significant difference at 
the .10 level, between the verdicts for the plaintiff in 
the structured ( M = .16) and unstructured group (M=.05), F 
(1,16)=.82. The Likert scale measures of the confidence 
in the verdict between the structured group (M=4.25) and 
the unstructured group (M=4.43) was not significant at the 
.10 level, F (1,16)= .46.
The Likert scale survey measures of the importance 
jurors attached to each piece of evidence also revealed no
31
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s i g n i f leant di+ference at the .10 level. Table 1 contains 
a summary of these results. It presents a statistical 
comparison of the mean rated evaluation of three 
categories and twelve subcategories of evidence between 
the two experimental cells. The evidence, it will be 
recalled, was rated on a 5 point Likert scale in terms of 
its importance for arriving at the verdict which the group 
rendered. On that scale a rating of 1 meant the evidence 
was "not important," a rating of 5 meant it was 
"extreme 1 y important" ( see appendices D and E > . In the 
table standard deviations are recorded in parenthesis next 
to their respective means.
Insert Table 1 about here
Since the above results were negative without
exception, it was decided to engage in a pairwise 
comparison of all groups on all measures: verdicts
r e a c h e d , confidence in verdicts and evaluation of 
evidence. The purpose of doing this was to determine if
such comparisons might suggest reasons for the lack of
significant results.
The statistical procedure chosen for these multiple 
comparisons was the Fisher significant difference test. 
While it provides protection against Type I errors, it is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
33
TABLE 1
Comparison of Likert Rat i ngs of Evidence Importanc
Between the Structured Group and Unstructured Group
Structured Unstructured (Pooled SD) F (1
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Ir 2.58 (.40) 2. 64 (.59) (.50) .05R 3.46 ( .26) 3.47 (.44) (.36) .01Ir/R . 76 ( . 10) . 78 ( . 14) ( . 12) . 05
D 3. H ( . 30) 2.85 (.47) ( .39) 1.92
D- 3.03 ( . 35) 2. 83 (.59) (.48) . 74
D + 3. 20 ( . 58) 2.88 (.48) (.53) 1. 63
C 3. 52 (.35) 3.69 ( .29) (.31) 1.28
C- 3.73 ( . 18) 3.88 (.24) (.21) 2.29
0 + 3. 31 (.64) 3.50 (.39) (.53) . 60
L 3. 69 (.49) 3.72 (.51) (.50) .02
L- 3. 96 (.60) 4.05 < . 46) ( . 53) . 13
L + 3.41 (.62) 3 « 38 (.70) ( . 66) .01
16)
Ir= average of the scores measuring the importance of 
irrelevant evidence <evidence concerning the seriousness 
of Mr. M a r s ’ injuries and financial losses).
R= average of the evaluations of the importance of all 
other case evidence.
Ir/R= the ratio between the two above measures.
D= all evidence regarding whether there was a defect in
the plane. D= (D- + D+) /2.
D- = all evidence against the existence of a d e fect.
D+= all evidence supporting the existence of a defect
C= all evidence germane to the question of whether a
possible defect caused the accident. C= (C- + C+)/2
C- = a l 1 evidence against the proposition that a defect in
the plane caused the accident.
C+ = all evidence supporting the claim that a defect in 
the plane caused the a c c i d e n t .
L= all evidence concerning whether the defendant has any 
legal re s p o n s i b i 1ity to the plaintiff, given that he was 
not the purchaser of the aircraft. L= (L- + L+)/2 
L- = all evidence against the existence of a legal 
obligation of the m a n u f a c t u r e r .
L+ = all evidence supporting the existence of a legal 
1ia b i 1ity.
sufficiently liberal to be appropriate for an area of 
# indicates significance at the .05 level
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study in an early stage of research. A statistical test 
that was too stringent might not allow suggestive and 
tentative patterns in the data to e m e r g e .
The initial analysis of variance among the three group 
verdict m e a n s , F (2,24)=.69, showed no difference at the 
.05 level. Thus, according to the procedure for the 
F i s h e r ’s t e s t , no further comparisons were made.
There were no Likert scale measures of confidence in 
the verdict for the short groups as that measure was not a 
part of the original experimental design and was added 
after the short groups had been run.
The pairwise comparisons of how the three experimental 
cells evaluated the evidence is best presented in four 
tables. In table 2, the results of the one way analysis 
of variance among all three group means is recorded for 
all measures of evidence evaluation. In tables 3 and 4, 
and 5 comparisons among the means, and the F i s h e r ’s 
significant difference statistic are listed for those 
measures which reached significance in the initial 
analysis of variance. That is, if the comparison among the 
three means on a particular measure did not reach 
signif i cance at the .05 level, pairwise comparisons 
between groups on that measure were not undertaken 
(although for the sake of completeness the results of F 
test comparisons of all measures is contained in
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appendices G and H and I).
Insert Tables 3, 4 and 5 about here
In that comparison by jury groups -failed to -find 
significant differences, it was questioned whether 
comparison of verdicts using individuals as the unit of 
measurement might show a trend that would be suggestive. 
An analysis of variance among the three groups showed a 
difference significant at the .05 level, F (2,155)= 4,51. 
Pairwise comparisons among the three groups showed no 
significant difference between the structured and 
unstructured groups nor between the short and unstructured 
group and a significant difference at the .05 level 
between the short group and the structured group 
FSD <51 df)= .154
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TABLE 2
Compar i son of Li ker t Ratings of Evidence Importance 
Between the Unstructured, Short and Structured Groups 
Unstructured Short Structured F (2,24)
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Ir 2.64 (.59) 2.49 (.59) 2.58 ( . 40) . 17
R 3. 47 (.44) 3.41 (.30) 3.46 (.26) . 08Ir/R . 78 ( . 14) . 73 ( . 15) . 76 ( . 10) . 12
D 2. 85 (.47) 2.80 (.35) 3.11 ( . 30) 1. 70
D- 2. 83 ( . 59) 3.05 ( . 20) 3.03 (.35) . 77
D + 2. 88 (.48) 2. 55 (.61) 3.20 ( . 58) 2.98
C 3.69 ( . 29) 3. 86 (.20) 3.52 ( . 35) 3.31
C- 3.88 (.24) 4. 67 (.21) 3.73 ( . 18) 51.62*
C + 3. 50 ( . 39) 3. 06 (.57) 3.31 (.64) 1.50
L 3.72 (.51) 3.04 (.46) 3. 69 (.61) 4. 23*
L- 4. 05 ( . 46) 2. 98 (.60) 3.96 ( . 60) 10.17*
L + 3.38 (.70) 3.09 (.90) 3.41 ( .62) .52
I r = average of the scores measuring the importance of
irrelevant evidence (evidence concerning the seriousness 
of Mr. M a r s ’ injuries and financial losses).
R= average of the evaluations of the importance of all
other case evidence.
Ir/R= the ratio between the two above measures.
D= all evidence regarding whether there was a defect in
the plane. D= (D- + D+) /2.
D- = all evidence against the existence of a d e f e c t .
D+= all evidence supporting the existence of a defect.
C= all evidence germane to the question of whether a 
possible defect caused the accident. C= (C- + C+)/2 
C- = all evidence against the proposition that a defect in 
the plane caused the accident.
C+ = all evidence supporting the claim that a defect in
the plane caused the accident.
L= all evidence concerning whether the defendant has any
legal responsibility to the plaintiff, given that he was
not the purchaser of the aircraft. L= (L- + L+)/2 
L- = all evidence against the existence of a legal
obligation of the m a n u f a c t u r e r .
L+ = all evidence supporting the existence of a legal
1 i a b i 1 i t y .
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TABLE 3
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Compar i son of Likert Ratings of Evidence Importance
Between the Structured Group and Short Group
Structured Shor t FSD, (24 df)
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
C- 3.73 (.18) 4.67 (.21) .94*
L 3. 69 (.61) 3.04 (.72) .65*
L- 3.96 (.60) 2.97 (.60) .99*
TABLE 4
Compar i son of Likert Ratings of Evidence Importance
Between the Unstructured Group and Short Group
Unstructured Short FSD (24 df)
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
C- 3.88 ( .24) 4.67 (.21) .79*
L 3. 72 (.51) 3.04 (.46) .68*
L- 4.05 ( .46) 2.98 (.60) 1 .07*
TABLE 5
Compar i son of Likert Ratings of Evidence Importance
Between the Structured Group and Unstructured Group
Structured Unstructured FSD (24 df)
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
C 3.52 (.35) 3.69 (.29) . 17
L 3.69 (.49) 3.72 (.51) . 03
L- 3.96 (.60) 4. 05 (.46) . 09
C= al 1 evidence germane to the question of whether a
possible defect caused the accident. C= (C- + C+Î/2
L= all evidence concerning whether the defendant has any 
legal r e s p o n s i b i 1ity to the plaintiff, given that he was 
not the purchaser of the aircraft. L= CL- + L+)/2 
L- = all evidence against the existence of a legal 
obligation of the manufacturer.
* indicates significance at the .05 level
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION
The hypothesis that structured instructions, requiring a 
jury to deal with the legal issues in a case one at a 
time, would be an aid to deliberation in a complex case 
was not supported. There were no signifieant differences
among the three experimental conditions in either the
number of decisions for the plaintiff nor the confidence
in the correctness of the verdict. Thus the central
hypothesis of the experiment was not confirmed.
There w e r e , likewise, no significant differences in the 
measure taken of the way the structured and unstructured 
groups evaluated the evidence. Thus it can not even be
asserted that, structured instructions had some effect on 
the way that j u r o r ’s perceived the evidence even if it was 
not reflected in a difference in verdicts. The comparisons 
failed to reach significance at the .05 and the .10
1ev e l 5.
There appear to be significant differences in the way
the evidence was evaluated between the structured and
short groups, as well as between the unstructured and
short groups. Possible interpretations of these
differences will be considered first. Following that,
possible explanations for the failure of the central
38
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experimental hypothesis to be supported and suggestions 
for future research will be considered.
The first issue to be considered is the differences in 
the way the evidence was evaluated between the short and 
the structured, and the short and unstructured groups. 
Before evaluation of differences can be undertaken, 
however, it must be noted that the evidence evaluation 
form was originally designed to answer the question of 
which of the experimental conditions placed more weight on 
evidence that was legally relevant to the case and which 
conditions placed more weight on emotional, but legally 
irrelevant factors such as the extent of the plaintiff's 
injuries and financial losses. The subjects are asked to 
rate on a Likert scale the importance of the evidence in 
reaching their decision. The original idea was not to 
break down the responses to determine how subjects 
responded to each category of evidence. When the predicted 
results did not o c c u r , a more detailed analysis was 
undertaken in order to gain some clue as to what the 
negative results might mean. But it must be remarked that 
the question asked the subjects: how “ important" each
piece of evidence was to the decision, is somewhat 
ambiguous. One does not really know what "importance" 
means to a particular subject. A piece of evidence may be
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rated important for highly idiosyncratic reasons, reasons 
which are related to the s u b j e c t ’s emotions rather than to 
correct legal logic. Yet it is not unreasonable to
hypothesize that when a subject rates pieces of evidence 
or argument which are highly favorable or unfavorable to 
an issue in the case as "important" that they are in 
agreement with that evidence. The expected tendency is to 
claim that arguments which we do not agree with are not 
important. As Hermann and others have found, we tend to 
insulate ourselves against evidence that disagrees with 
our position ( Herman, 1977, Aronson, 1973). Thus in 
examining how the evidence was rated, some suggestions
might be discovered as to the pattern of deliberation in 
the various experimental conditions. Nevertheless, the 
inferences from the quest ionai re are not as clear as one 
would like because of the ambiguous nature of an 
evaluation of "importance."
The short group (M= 4.67) evaluated the evidence that a 
defect was not the cause of the accident as more important
in coming to their verdicts than either the structured
(M=3.73) or the unstructured (3.88) groups. Analysis by 
means of F i s h e r ’s significant difference test showed that 
the differences were significant at the .05 level: FSD (24 
d f )=.9 4 , FSD (24 d f )=.79 respectively. This would tend to 
support the contention that in the shortened version of
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the case the legal issues were somewhat clearer. The 
question of whether a defect was the cause of the 
accident is a pivotal one. To make the correct legal
decision a subject must be able to make a distinction
between a direct and indirect cause of an accident. A 
headlight failure may have indirectly caused the 
unfortunate landing, but the failure of the headlights was 
in no sense a direct cause. The fact that the short group 
rated evidence bearing on this point significantly 
higher would tend to support the contention that in the 
shortened version of the case the issues were clearer. The 
arguments that the headlights were not the direct cause 
were arguably the most important ones in the case. The 
groups that heard the longer case version did not attach 
as much significance to these a r guments, possibly because 
they were distracted by the multitude of other evidence 
and did not fully appreciate its pivotal nature. However, 
it must be admitted that it is not certain that the short
group rated the evidence as they did because they were
following the legal instructions rather than heeding a 
common sense notion of what was just. The lesser amount of 
information may have made the lack of causal relation 
between the defect and the accident stand out, but it can 
not be stated as fact that the reason why it stood out was 
because the short group was applying the case law rather
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than some commonsensical notion of fairness.
Both the structured ( M= 3.69) and unstructured (M= 
3.72) groups rated the evidence against there being a 
legal obligation toward Mr. Mars more highly than the 
short group (M=3.04). The analysis by means of F i s h e r ’s 
significant difference test showed that the respective 
differences were significant: FSD <24df)=.99, FSD (24df)= 
1.07, p < .05. What this suggests is that the groups who
heard the longer case did not fully understand the concept 
of legal responsibility. As the case was written, legal 
responsibility is taken to mean that there is a 
re s p o n s i b i 1i ty to redress legitimate grievances if such 
exist. In this case there was no legitimate grievance, 
though the Airlite corporation would have been responsible 
for damages if such had existed.
The suggestion that the groups who heard the longer case 
presentation may not have understood the concept of legal 
responsibility is supported by the fact that in the 
structured condition tie. the only condition for which 
data were kept as to how each issue was decided) 39 of 51 
jurors said there was no legal responsibi1 ity. This
suggests that even though both the structured and 
unstructured groups did not fully understand the complex
legal instructions in the case, they were unswayed by
emotional appeals and the plight of Mr. M a r s . Given that
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they were not moved by his appeal, it did not matter that 
they did not fully understand legal responsibi1ity. Yet 
the evidence remains that, in fact, they were confused. 
They may have been more confused than the juries that 
heard the shorter version of the case, who rated the
evidence against legal liability less important to their 
dec i s i o n s .
The above considerations would support the contention
that the case scenario presented to the structured and 
unstructured groups was complex enough to be somewhat 
confusing. If that is the case it may have been an 
adequate initial test of the hypothesis that structured
instructions are an aid to accurate application of the law 
by Juries in complex cases. In that event the negative 
results are more damaging to the central hypothesis.
The differences found through comparisons of the 
structured and unstructured groups with the short group in 
their respective evaluations of cause and liability are 
rather tantalizing. There is a temptation to speculate 
about what differences there might be between the 
structured and unstructured groups by using these 
comparisons with the short group. However, if there are no 
statistically significant differences between the
structured and unstructured groups, it is not possible to 
use data demonstrating how those groups compare with a
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third entity to show that there might indeed be 
d i fferences between them. The short group heard a 
dit-ferent case. It was a shorter version of the same case, 
but it remains to be demonstrated what effect case length 
might have on deliberations.
The absence of significant differences among the groups
is disappointing but it may also be promising for future
study, as will be considered shortly. Given that this is 
a new area of rese a r c h , perhaps the results are not 
surprising. It is to be expected that a certain number of 
attempts might be required to perfect a methodology. In 
this preliminary study, it is hard to disentangle what may 
be limitations in the method from the possibility that the 
hypothesis is flawed. Yet, in that the study has yielded a 
number of questions for future research, ideas for 
improvement of the method, and that negative results have 
bearing on certain important legal and social issues, the 
effort has some benefit.
In this section hypotheses will be considered which
might explain these results and, more importantly, 
questions will be formed which might guide future
re s e a r c h . There are three questions that need to be
considered. First, what are possible explanations for
these results? The second question is related to and may
often best be considered simultaneously with the first:
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how might future research be conducted in order to provide
a better test of the hypothesis? Thirdly, what bearing do
the results have on the questions about the jury system 
raised by the recent insurance crisis? Negative results 
from this experiment have some bearing on current 
questions about the ability of the jury system to justly
handle the increasing number of liability suits.
First, let us consider possible explanations for the 
results. There appear to be six obvious hypotheses. Not 
all are mutually exclusive; some combination of them may 
have been acting together. A) It may be that structured 
instructions are of no help w h a t soever. It is possible 
that in complex cases, breaking the issues down and 
deciding them one at a time does not aid deliberation. B) 
In the present study it appears that the central 
hypothesis described above in A was not tested. The case 
scenario used may have been flawed. C> Perhaps it is more 
difficult to construct a civil trial scenario which 
adequately engages a jury than it is to construct a 
similar one for a criminal case . Almost all of the work 
on the validity of jury simulations has involved criminal 
c a s e s . It is not obvious, on reflection, that the evidence 
for the adequacy of criminal trial simulations can be 
applied to civil cases. D)It is possible that the results 
of this study may be due to what social psychologists call
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high objective self awareness ( Wicklund, 1975). Use of a 
tape recorder to record the deliberations may have 
produced a condition where the jurors responded in ways 
that conform to their ideals, but not to what can be 
expected of actual jury behavior. E ) The measures used
may not have been sensitive enough to record subtle
differences between groups. F )There is an implicit premise 
behind the present study that juries often fail to decide 
complex civil cases in conformance with the law. This has 
become a national issue, brought about by complaints from 
several sectors, including insurance companies, 
manufacturers and physicians about irrational and 
excessive jury awards. Perhaps juries are more sensible
than we have been led to believe. If that is the case,
then the results are what one would expect and the concern 
expressed about the jury system may be an instance of 
illusory correlation.
Let us consider these explanations one by one, at the 
same time considering ways in which research could be 
designed to address the unanswered questions produced by 
this s t u d y .
Firstly, it appears that the hypothesis advanced in the 
experiment has not been tested. Pilot work led the 
researcher to believe that there would be far more 
variation in verdict response from jury members. Pilot
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47
group members maintained a lively debate, great
uncertainty and variation in response to the scenario. The 
overwhelming rejection of the complaints of the plaintiff 
by the research subjects in the full scale study leaves 
the central question u n a nswered. There are two 
possibilities suggested by this result. First, structured 
instructions may be of no help to jurors in deciding 
complex cases. Or, secondly, this particular trial
simulation, which reached a fair level of complexity, and 
demanded that subjects process and retain information 
after only aural presentation, was not complex enough for 
structured instructions to be needed and to prove their 
value. The present results might be taken to imply that a 
still more complex and lengthy case must be constructed to 
test the hypothesis.
In many ways the central issue of the case is whether a 
defect in the plane was the cause of the accident. All of 
the irrelevancies of the case were essentially means to 
obscure the realization that that is the central point. As 
stated above, an argument can be made from the results 
that the groups that received the shortened transcript 
found it easiest to get to the heart of the case. That is,
short groups <M=4.67), rated the evidence that a defect
was not the cause of the accident significantly higher 
than the structured groups (M=3.73) or the unstructured
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groups <M = 3 .88). The F i s h e r ’s significant difference test 
indicated a significant difference in both comparisons: 
FSD (2 4 d f )=.94 and FSD (24df)=.79 respectively. The 
differences were significant at the .05 level. This would 
lead to a conclusion that the full trial presentation used 
was indeed more difficult than the shortened transcript. 
But it may not have been complex enough for differences in 
verdicts to begin to appear between the structured and 
unstructured groups. Admittedly this is speculation, but 
without further study the question can not be answered.
Complexity in a simulated case can be increased in two 
directions. The case might be made more intellectually 
complex, more emotionally complex, or both. To increase 
intellectual complexity one might add more information, 
more intricate legal distinctions, more arguments, more 
issues to be decided. Emotional complexity would be 
increased by making the plight of the plaintiff more 
severe and his character more empathetically engaging.
The results also imply a need for very extensive pilot 
work to refine a case to a crucial intermediate point 
where it is complex enough to produce variation in 
response, while not becoming so complex that in effect 
juror responses are random because no one understands the 
issues at all. The problem in producing such a scenario is 
made more difficult by the fact that the scenario created
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must be capable of being run In a very limited period of 
time. It must clearly have a correct result, but the 
result can not be obvious. This is not a simple task and 
clearly calls for more extensive preexperimental testing 
than was originally envisioned.
There is a related question to the above consideration
of the difficulties of creating a proper test case
scenario. Almost all of the work done in the area of jury
research has dealt with the problems of criminal law.
There is evidence, cited above, that simulations with
undergraduates are adequate approximations of courtroom
behavior with such cases. But it might be questioned
whether the same holds for civil trials. There is little 
experimental evidence to support that belief; it is not at
all obvious a grj,ori_ that the two types of simulation are
equivalent. It may well be that there is a different
empathet i c situation in a civil case. In a criminal case,
in essence, the problem is whether something should be
taken away from defendant : liberty or life. In a civil
case the question is whether something should be given to
the plaintiff: damages or compensation. It is possible
that many of us empathize with the prisoner on the dock
and weigh his fate with some care. On the other hand the
civil complainant may be seen as having created his own
troubles, or at least empathy may be divided between two
contestants. In the criminal case the issues are of direct
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ennotional immediacy; m u r d e r , rape, theft, etc. In the 
civil case the actual events and responsibilities may be 
more convoluted and less immediate. In the criminal case a 
Type I error (to convict falsely) is abhorrent. In a civil 
case a Type I error ( to deny compensation where deserved) 
may not seem as serious. It may well be that in the 
simulation of civil cases it is more difficult to attain 
the desired degree of experimental realism, in order to 
engage the mock jury with the problem in the same way that 
they are engaged in an actual civil trial. In reference 
to the present experiment, it is possible that the 
expected results were not obtained because the subjects 
were not involved with the situation as a real jury would 
be. In a civil case, if one can not fully feel with and 
for the plaintiff then the verdict will probably go to the 
d e f e n d a n t .
In future studies it may be necessary to use videotape 
as a more immediate and emotionally forceful medium in 
order to bring jury involvement to a level analogous to 
that found in the courtroom. One might take a hint from 
lawyers such as Peter Perlman who wrote in an article on 
how to sway the civil jury that "it is incumbent upon the 
trail attorney to turn the dead, inanimate stack of paper 
known as the "hospital record" into a living demonstration 
of pain, anxiety and depression "(Perlman, 1984).
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It may be desirable in future studies to include a 
measure of the degree of empathy and identification with 
plaintiff and defendant in order to gain some better idea 
of how subjects are responding to the information they are 
presented. Information about the empathy felt for the 
plaintiff serves as a check on the effectiveness of the 
trial scenario in involving the experimental subject in a 
meaningful way. A measure of empathy also gives some 
insight into whether the jury voted on the basis of logic 
or emotion. If there is no empathy for the plaintiff, a 
vote against him may tell little about whether the jury 
fully analyzed the issues in the case or simply felt 
little concern for his plight. If, however, a simulated 
jury has considerable empathy for the plaintiff and still 
votes against him, then one can assume that they have made 
a fully rational decision. The same might be said, though 
less compel 1ingly, if subjects have little empathy for the 
plaintiff and vote in his favor.
Social psychology produces another possible explanation 
for the experimental results. The experimental procedure 
required that someone be in the room to operate a tape 
recorder to record the jury deliberations in order to 
capture them for possible future research. The social- 
psychological research on objective self awareness leads 
to an interesting question in regard to the presence of
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the observer and the recorder. Inadvertently, a situation 
was set up in which the subjects may have been made 
objectively self aware. The research would indicate that 
under those c i rcumst a n c e s , in order to reduce dissonance 
between perceived self image and behavior, they would be 
more likely to behave according to their principles and 
i d e a l s ( Wicklund, 1975, Gibbons & Wicklund 1976). Or, in 
the more recent reformulation, even if the process of 
looking inward is not aversive, it leads to a continual 
adjustment process by which we compare our behavior to 
internal standards (Carver & Scheier, 1981, Scheier & 
Carver 1982). In any case, high self awareness tends to 
lead to improved performance on a variety of tasks.
In cases where juries incorrectly apply the law it might 
be thought of as stemming from one of two sources. First, 
they may well fail to comprehend the facts and the law and 
thus come to improper conclusions. Second, they may be 
tempted to apply their own version of what they think the 
law should be in defiance of what the law prescribes. As 
mentioned above, jurors are more likely to do this when 
confused by a complex case ( Kaplan &c Miller, 1978, Sue, 
Smith & Caldwell, 1973). A state of high self awareness 
might help minimize both sources of error. Objective self 
awareness might have led subjects to listen and deliberate 
more carefully, thus working harder than a jury ordinarily
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might. It has been repeated 1 y established that high self 
awareness increases the care with which a task is 
accomplished. Second, knowing that they were being taped, 
a temptation on the part of subjects to side with the
defendant out of pity might well be minimized. There has 
been a good deal of attention in the media about the
crisis in the insurance industry and problems of large 
jury awards. It is reasonable to believe that a good 
number of the subjects were well aware that they "should" 
not let their emotions get in the way of an objective 
verdict. A state of high self awareness may well have made 
it less likely that they would do s o ­
in the future it may be best not to tape the mock jury 
deliberations and to have no outside observer in the room 
in order to avoid this possible interference with the
experimental manipulation.
There is another possible explanation for the results. 
Structured instructions would doubtlessly make it 
necessary to debate a case more systematically and 
thoroughly. Examining the case in a more systematic 
fashion may well lead to a more fully considered approach 
to both sides, in itself causing some confusion.
There may be two kinds of jury confusion. One type may 
be evoked by extreme complexity of evidence and strength 
of emotional appeal. The juror may be left with a global
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impression of the events he has witnessed which may not be 
at all in conformance with the law or the evidence. And 
w o r s e , this painful state of confusion might leave him 
unwilling or unable to consider the evidence in a 
multifaceted way. Having achieved some tenuous command of 
what he had just witnessed, the juror may be quite 
unwilling to consider other possibilities to his own 
construal of the evidence. This might be thought of, to 
borrow a term from S h a p i r o ’s study of neurotic style, as 
the "hysterical fallacy" in jury deliberation ( 1965).
Shapiro said of hysterical cognition that it is "global, 
relatively diffuse, and lacking in sharpness, particularly 
in sharp d e t a i l . ” He adds that for the hysterical person 
"the hunch or the impression is the final, conscious 
cognitive product (1965)."
In some cases a jury might enter deliberation seeking 
only to confirm their global prejudices, determined to 
gloss over differences and ignore distinctions that get in 
the way of consensus. This kind of confusion might be 
decreased by forcing the jury to engage in a systematic 
deliberation procedure, such as the one in this study.
There may be a second type of confusion, however. This, 
to again borrow a term from Shapiro, might be thought of 
as leading to the "obsessive fallacy" in deliberation. 
Shapiro describes the o b s e s s i v e ’s process of attention as
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being "markedly limited in both mobility and range...And 
some aspects of the world are simply not to be apprehended 
by sharply focused and concentrated attention <1965)." 
Structured deliberation might encourage getting bogged 
down in details of argument to the point where the central 
focus of the case is lost sight of in the welter of
detail. A structured instruction set forces consideration 
of all arguments systematically. If the obsessive model is 
apt, this can possibly lead to an impulsive decision after 
lengthy rumination. While these thoughts are highly 
speculative, it seems worth considering that perhaps 
systematic deliberation is a two edged sword. The one jury 
that voted solidly for the plaintiff was in the structured 
condition. While the verdict patterns between jury groups 
in the structured and unstructured conditions do not 
reveal a significant difference, the fact that the only 
jury to vote for the plaintiff was in the structured
condition is worth brief consideration. It is possible
that structured deliberation can sometimes hinder
deliberation until a case reaches a certain level of 
complexity. When structured instructions are used on a 
case that is too simple for them to be appropriate, they 
may encourage preoccupation with details of the evidence 
and argument that may obscure attaining a sense of the 
case as a whole. If this is the case, the issue of whether
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structured instructions are helpful in jury deliberations 
would need to take into account two factors. First, 
structured instructions might aid deliberation by making 
sure that all of the evidence and all of the law are 
systematically considered. But, secondly, it is also 
possible that under certain c i rcumstances they may hinder 
deliberation by discouraging the attainment of a global 
view of the case. If that is true, the problem of whether 
structured instructions should be used in the legal system 
might be very complex. In support of the notion that 
structured instructions may in some cases not help, when 
comparing jury verdicts, using the individual subject as 
the unit of measurement, there was a significant 
difference at the .05 level between the structured and 
short groups but none between the unstructured and short 
groups. While it is problematic, to attempt to draw 
conclusions about differences between groups by comparing 
them with a third entity, it would appear that structured 
instructions made the case somewhat more difficult for the 
structured group. The unstructured gr o u p , in rendering 
verdicts, behaved like the short group, which had a 
simpler task. The structured group behaved in a way 
significantly different from the short group.
There is another possible flaw in the experimental 
design that needs to be considered. In this experiment
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subjects were were required to decide to either give the 
plaintiff the money he asked for or give nothing. There 
was no possibility to temporize and give a small award. 
The forced choice may have removed a great deal of 
sensitivity from the measure. Because the jurors were not 
allowed to strike a compromise, they may have been 
stricter than they would ordinarily be inclined to be. It 
is possible that if jurors had been allowed to give 
various sizes of awards, differences between groups might 
have appeared.
A number of scientific studies, such as those cited in 
the introduction have questioned the accuracy and fairness 
of jury deliberations. Similar doubts are increasingly 
voiced in the legal community and the popular press about 
the ability of juries to reach conclusions in correct 
conformance with the the law and the evidence. The year of 
1986 saw a kind of high water mark of concern over the 
tort system marked by a perceived insurance crisis where 
horror stories circulated of "price hikes of up to 1000% 
and a b r u p t , unprovoked cancellation of policies" (Farrell, 
1987). Some claimed the crisis was manufactured by the 
insurance industry to raise rates. Yet as US Assistant 
Attorney General Richard K. Willard stated : "We d o n ’t
think there is credible evidence that the liability crisis 
is a hoax. The insurance industry is the middleman" (Gatty
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1987). Men like Blair Childs, director of the American 
Tort Reform Association said, "We’re in trouble because we 
have moved so far away from a court system based on fault. 
W e ’ve moved to a compensation system, with the concept 
that somebody must pay regardless." (Gatty, 1987) In 
response to the problem three dozen states made minor 
changes in their liability laws (Farrell, 1987). The 
efforts for reform of the civil justice system have not 
yet abated. An initiative to limit jury awards was on the 
ballot last election in Montana and was approved.
At first glance the results from this experiment would 
tend to question whether the current cynicism about jury 
awards is w a r r a n t e d . The results are somewhat
reassuring. In this study, using a convoluted case with 
complex instruetions, involving direct emotional appeal
to the sympathies of the jury, a total of 25 of the 27
groups who heard the case voted solidly for the defendant. 
In 3 juries there was a minority of 1 who voted for the 
plaintiff, in a single jury there was a minority of 2. 
Given the evidence that the the majority will usually sway 
the dissenters, one can probably assume that given further 
deliberation the verdict would have been unanimous for the 
defendant. The results raise the question of whether a 
great deal of presently expressed concern about the jury 
system is justified. Christopher Farrell, a correspondent
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for Business Week wrote in May of 1987 that "Cool analysis 
is discrediting last y e a r ’s horror stories about an 
epidemic of m u l t i m i 11ion-dol1ar jury awards for relatively 
little cause." (Farrell, 1987) He cites an American
Enterprise Institute study of 359 cases from 1982-85 
mostly involving product liability showing that in that
sampling punitive damages represented "insignificant"
amounts. Perhaps some of the current concern about the
legal system represents an instance of illusory
correlation as described by Chapman ( Chapman, 1967). The
presence of a few confirming instances may be leading the
public to conclude that there is a grave structural
problem where none exists.
One jury was evenly split, one voted solidly for the 
plaintiff. It is impossible to say in what direction the 
split jury would have voted. Thus it is possible that 2 of 
the 27 juries would have voted for the plaintiff. That 
would mean that 7.4% would have made a decision not in 
conformance with the law and the evidence. On the one hand 
it is reassuring, given the concerns that have been 
expressed about the jury system that there w e r e n ’t more 
errors. Yet on further consideration justice that fails 
7.4% of the time or even 3.7% is worrisome. The concept of 
an error factor in human behavior seems benign until one 
begins to envision it depriving citizens of their
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property. The experiment obviously does not begin to give 
an estimate of what the error factor in actual jury 
deliberations might be. But the point, rather, seems to be 
that here one has what appears to most juries to be an 
open and shut c a s e . And yet one jury was evenly split and 
another voted solidly opposite to majority opinion.
One of the conclusions the present study might suggest 
is that instances in which a jury is swayed by sympathy 
for the plaintiff to give inappropriate awards may be 
rather infrequent. And this would not be a trivial result.
If it is the case that jury mistakes in this area are 
infrequent, then to study the phenomenon it would be 
necessary to do a number of things. Much larger sample 
sizes would be needed. Given a very low base line 
phenomena a large sample is needed to detect differences 
between groups. Given that the sample sizes might need to 
be so large as to be impractical, if groups are the unit 
of observation, the inclination might be to declare the 
unit of observation to be the individual in the early 
stages of exper imentat i o n . While it does not necessarily 
follow that differences in individuals will be transferred 
into group differences once individuals are subjected to 
group process, individual perceptions are the raw 
materials with which the group works. If there are no 
differences in individual perceptions, there is no need to
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seek them through group p r o c e s s .
Further, it might be suggested that a more homogeneous 
group should be sought in order to decrease the error 
variance. Thus external validity would be sacr if i ced at an 
early stage of research in order to first try to establish 
a model to be carried into later research with greater 
real world application. Given that the subject pool in 
this experiment was fairly homogeneous already, this may 
not be a very practical suggestion.
As a final thought, there is the considérât ion of 
vulnérabilités in the legal system suggested by these 
results. On the one hand it is suggested that there may 
be greater abilities on the part of jurors to sort through 
diversions, digressions and irrelevancies than many have 
recently been led to believe. In this study, a case 
designed to confuse, did not do so for the vast majority 
of subjects. That is rather good news. Yet one jury voted 
solidly for the plaintiff. And one jury was split. This 
would seem to suggest that it is worthwhile to study ways 
to reduce jury confusion. The purpose of this study and 
others like it is to attempt to find ways to decrease 
v u l n e r a b i 1ity to juror e r r o r . But in thinking about the 
results there is a radical question that suggests itself. 
D o e s n ’t this kind of effort on the part of psychology 
ignore what may be the greatest source of juror error? Our
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tradition of law makes the lawyer an advocate, responsible 
to little other than his advocacy. He must present the 
best case possible. He may not lie, but he does not need 
to ask himself what the truth may be. His sole 
responsibility is to represent his client as well as he 
can. As Sir Edward Marshall Hall expressed it: "A lawyer
and an actor are akin. It is true that I have no m a s k , I 
have no black cloth and I have no floodlights to help 
bring illusion; but out of the miseries and the joys and 
experience of men, I must create an atmosphere of living 
reality so that it may be felt and understood by others, 
for this is advocacy." (Perlman, 1981) Given what we know 
about the difficulties subjects have in processing 
complex, emotionally charged information, one is not at 
all confident that justice is assured by having two great 
actors engage in a duel of thespian skill. Perhaps lawyers 
might be taught that they have an obligation to truth as 
well as to clients. It would be a different way of looking 
at the law and their w o r k . It is not a likely suggestion 
or seriously advanced as a possibility. But in considering 
the problem of jury perception of complex materials, at 
times one wonders how far justice has advanced from trial 
by combat. Yet given the fact that the legal tradition is 
not likely to change in the near future, studies such as 
the present one seem vital to determine how best to aid
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the juror in untangling the spells that lawyers attempt to 
w e a v e .
SUMMARY
In summary, the hypothesis of the experiment that
structured instructions can be of help to jurors as they
attempt to apply the law to a complex case was not
supported. There were no significant differences between 
the structured and unstructured groups. The results may be 
due to the fact that the hypothesis is not true or that 
the scenario was not complex enough to warrant the use of 
structured instructions. It is even possible that
structured instructions may have some hindering effects on 
deliberation which might cancel their positive benefits. 
It is possible that, inadvertently, a condition of high 
self awareness was created in the jurors, thus making them 
more conscientious than they would ordinarily be. It is 
also possible that the jurors were not sufficiently 
engaged by the scenario.The measures may have been lacking 
in sensitivity or perhaps contrary to popular belief 
j urors are better able to apply the law than we have been 
led to believe. All of these questions can only be 
resolved by further research.
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Aeaendix A
Airlite, a manufacturer of small airplanes, guaranteed 
that it would pay for any injury to the buyer of one of 
its planes which resulted from the operation of an Airlite 
aircraft, if the reason for the damage was the negligence 
of Airlite. Roger Hanson lent his friend Frank Mars his
new 1 y purchased Airlite plane for the weekend. Frank was a 
careful pilot and had never been in an accident. Just 
after takeoff, he noticed that the plane’s headlights did 
not appear to be working. He decided to turn back to the 
airport and have them repaired before dark. However, as 
Frank was approach i ng the runway, the plane was caught by 
a sudden gust of wind that sent it crashing into the 
ground.
Mr. Mars broke his arm and fractured his skull. 
He was in the hospital for six weeks and when he got out
he found that he did not have full use of his left hand
because of the injury and he suffered occasional dizzy 
spells on account of the blow to his head. Frank Mars was 
a heavy equipment operator and thus found himself unable 
to work. His hospital bills were far beyond his ability 
to p a y . His car was repossessed and he fell behind in 
payments on his house. Working part time as a box boy, the 
only work he could g e t , and with his wife working as a 
secretary, they could barely support their five children.
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Thus Frank Mars sued Airlite for the cost of his injuries 
and the loss of his livelihood, asking for money for- 
retraining in another occupation.
Frank contended that if it were not for the failed 
headlight on the airplane he would not have tried to make 
a landing when he did and would not have crashed. Thus, 
according to his attorney, the failed headlight was the 
cause of the accident.
Airlite contended that the cause of the accident was the 
gust of wind. No structural defect in the aircraft had 
caused the cr a s h . The Airlite attorney asked, "If poor Mr. 
Mars has turned back because he forgot his lunch, would we 
then be responsible? If you answer no, then you can not 
hold us responsible in this accident. There is nothing 
that we did or did not do that caused this unfortunate 
mi s h a p . "
Airlite further claimed that their guarantee was to the 
purchaser of the aircraft, Roger Hansen, and that under 
state law they had little obligation to Mr. Mars who did 
not actually buy the plane from them. The lawyer for 
Airlite argued that since Mr. Hanson lent the plane, it 
was his responsibi1ity if the plane was defective.
The lawyer for Mr. Mars argued that although a 
manufacturer's legal obligation was primarily to the 
original buyer, the law was never intended to mean that if
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you w e r e n ’t the original buyer, the manufacturer had no 
responsibi1i ty at all. In this case, Mr. Hanson had lent 
Mr. Mars a new plane and had no reason to believe that 
there was a defect. Therefore he had no responsibility.
The lawyer for Airlite argued that Frank Mars should 
have inspected the headlights before he took o f f .
F r a n k ’s attorney countered that headlight inspection was 
not part of the standard pre-flight check and that it was 
only by accident that Frank had happened to pull the light 
switch and notice the light problem once he was in the
air.
Frank M a r s ’ attorney also argued that the type of 
headlight installed on the model 1200 Airlite, which Frank 
was flying, was a new experimental type of aviation light
which had a reputation for being unreliable. He also tried
to prove that after the accident, faulty soldering was 
found in one of the light connections. A former employee 
of Airlite was testified that in his experience the
electrical work on Airlite planes was often faulty.
The lawyer for the Airlite company, however, brought out 
the fact that the employee who claimed that Airlite work 
was often faulty had been fired from the company for drug 
use and had left making threats to get even.
In defense of Airlite, their lawyer produced witnesses 
who testified that the headlights on the model 1200 were
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the same as those used on 5 other models of small plane 
and that there had been few problems reported. Expert 
witnesses also stated that the claim that the soldering 
connections on the headlights had been faulty could not be 
proven, because the plane had been so badly damaged in the 
accident that there was no way anyone could tell if the 
connection had been badly wired by Airlite.
The attorney for Mr. Mars argued that although there had 
not been a large number of failures of the new type 
headlights on the Airlite plane, a sophisticated 
statistical analysis of the failure rate revealed that 
there was a high probability that the headlights had a 
design defect.
The Airlite attorneys ridiculed the statistical analysis 
of Mr. Mar s ’ attorney, saying you could make any point you 
wanted with statistics. He quoted the saying that "there 
were three kinds of lies: lies, damn lies and statistics."
The Airlite attorney further contended that Mr. Hanson, 
the original owner of the plane, was an inexperienced 
pilot known for his rough landings. He very well could 
have jolted the plane so badly in the week he owned it, 
that he damaged the headlights before he had lent it to 
his unfortunate friend.
The lawyer for Mr. Mars argued that the plane was barely 
a week old. Even if there had been some rough landings, it
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surely should have been built to withstand a bump or two 
w i thout wiring com i ng 1o o s e .
LEGAL PRINCIPLES:
i) If the nature of a product is such that it is 
reasonably certain to place life and limb in danger, the
manufacturer is legally responsible for all damages to
the purchaser due to the manufacturer’s negligence.
2) The manufacturer’s primary responsibi1ity is to the 
purchaser of his product. He has a lesser legal 
responsibi1ity to those who come to use his products 
without having bought them from him or his agents. If the 
product is acquired by theft, there is no responsibility. 
If it IS borrowed, the lender may have equal 
responsibi1ity for the condition of the product.
3) A person or company shall be considered negligent if 
they are directly responsible for an injury to another 
person who had reason to expect that they would take 
precautions to prevent that injury.
4) A person can be considered directly responsible for 
someone el s e 's injury if their act made that injury, in
the view of a reasonable and prudent man, nearly 
unavoidable.
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A^Qendix B
Airlite, was a manufacturer of small airplanes. Roger 
Hanson lent his friend Frank Mars his newly purchased
Airlite plane for the weekend. Just after takeoff, Frank
Mars noticed that the pl a n e ’s headlights did not appear to
be working. He decided to turn back to the airport and
have them repaired before dark. However, as Frank was 
approach i ng the runway, the plane was caught by a sudden 
freak gust of wind that sent it crashing into the ground.
Mr. Mars broke his arm and fractured his skull. He was 
in the hospital for six weeks and when he got out he found 
that he did not have full use of his left hand because of 
the injury and he suffered occasional dizzy spells an 
account of the blow to his head. Frank Mars was a heavy 
equipment operator and thus found himself unable to work. 
Thus Frank Mars sued Airlite for the cost of his injuries 
and the loss of his livelihood, asking for money for 
retraining in another occupation.
Frank contended that if it were not for the failed 
headlight on the airplane he would not have tried to make
a landing when he did and thus would not have crashed.
Thus, according to his attorney, the failed headlight was
the cause of the accident.
Airlite contended that the cause of the accident was the
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gust of wind. No structural defect in the aircraft was 
responsible for the accident. The Airlite attorney asked, 
"If poor Mr. Mars has turned back because he forgot his 
lunch, would we then be responsible? If you answer no, 
then you can not hold us responsible in this accident. 
There is nothing that we did or did not do that caused 
this unfortunate m i s h a p . "
The lawyer for Frank Mars produced an expert witness who 
testified that faulty soldering was found in one of the 
light connections of the plane after the accident. A 
former employee of Airlite also testified that the 
electrical work on Airlite planes was often faulty.
The lawyer for the Airlite company, however, brought out 
the fact that the employee who claimed that Airlite work 
was often faulty had been fired from the company for drug 
use and might be trying to get ev e n . Airlite also produced 
expert witnesses of its own who testified that the plane 
was so badly damaged in the accident that it was difficult 
to tell if the light connection had been badly wired by 
A i r 1i t e .
Airlite further claimed that their guarantee was to the 
purchaser of the aircraft, Roger Hansen, and that under 
state law they had little obligation to Mr. Mars who did 
not actually buy the plane from them. The lawyer for 
Airlite argued that since Mr. Hanson lent the plane, it
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was his responsibility i+ the plane was defective.
The lawyer for Mr. Mars argued that although a 
manufacturer's legal obligation was primarily to the 
original buyer, the law was never intended to mean that if 
you we r e n ’t the original buyer, the manufacturer had no 
responsibility at all. In this case, Mr. Hanson had lent 
Mr. Mars a new plane and had no reason to believe that 
there was a defect. Therefore he had no responsibility. 
LEGAL PRINCIPLES:
1) If the nature of a product is such that it is 
reasonably certain to place life and limb in danger, the 
manufacturer is legally responsible for all damages to 
the purchaser due to the manuf ac turer’s negligence.
2) The manufacturer’s primary responsibility is to the 
purchaser of his product. He has a lesser legal 
responsibi1ity to those who come to use his products 
without having bought them from him or his agents. If the 
product is acquired by theft, there is no responsibility. 
If it is borrowed, the lender may have equal 
responsibility for the condition of the product.
3) A person or company shall be considered negligent if 
they are directly responsible for an injury to another 
person who had reason to expect that they would take 
precautions to prevent that injury.
4) A person can be considered directly responsible for
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someone e i s e ’s injury if their act made that injury, in 
the view of a reasonable and prudent m a n , nearly 
unavoidable.




(read to the jurors)
USE THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES STATED IN THE CASE TO DECIDE 
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:
1) Does Airlite have a legal responsibility to 
Frank Mars?
YES NO___
2) Did Airlite cause the defect in the headlights? 
YES NO___
3) Was that defect responsible for the accident? 
YES NO
If you answer "^es” to all of the above questions, 
that is, if you decide that: 1) Airlite is legally
responsible to Mr. Mars, 2) the plane was defectively 
made by Airlite, and 3) the defect was directly 
responsible for the accident, then Airlite was 
negligent and you must decide in favor of Mr. Mars.
WHAT IS YOUR VERDICT?
(please place a check mark by your verdict)
I DECIDE IN FAVOR OF MR. MARS______
I DECIDE IN FAVOR OF AIRLITE CO.______
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Unstructured Instructions 
(read to the jurors)
USE THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES STATED IN THE CASE TO DECIDE 
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:
Does Airlite have a legal responsibi1ity to Frank
Mars?
Did Airlite cause the defect in the headlights?
Was that defect responsible for the accident?
If you answer "yes " to all of the above questions, 
that is, if you decide that : 1) Airlite is legally
responsible to Mr. Mars, 2) the plane was defectively 
made by Airlite, and 3) the defect was directly 
responsible for the accident, then Airlite was
negligent and you must decide in favor of Mr. Mars.
WHAT IS YOUR VERDICT?
(please place a check mark by your verdict)
I DECIDE IN FAVOR OF MR. MARS______
I DECIDE IN FAVOR OF AIRLITE CO.______
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APPENDIX D
Please answer the questions below as carefully as you 
can. Your answers will be compared to those of actual 
jurors. The information you give is vital to the success 
of the experiment. I very much appreciate your 
coopérât i o n .
Below you will find the a list of statements made in 
the case you just heard. Below each statement you will 
Also find a rating scale. Please rate how important each 
piece of evidence was in arriving at your verdict.
For instance, if think a fact was not important in 
deciding the case the way you did, you would circle the 
"1" on the scale.
If you felt the fact was extremely important in 
arriving at your verdict, you would circle the "5" on the 
s e a l e .
For example, if you felt that it was a very important 
piece of information in helping you reach your verdict 
that "Frank Mars was a careful pilot," you would rate that 
statement "4." And you would circle the "4" on the scale 
below the statement, just like on the scale below.
1 2 3 4 5
not a little somewhat very extremely
important important
Thank you for your help. *•*■*
1) Airlite, guaranteed that it would pay for any
injury to the buyer of one of its planes which resulted 
from the operation of an Airlite aircraft, if the reason 
for the damage was the negligence of Airlite.
T
1 2 3 4 5
not a little somewhat very extremely
important important
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2) Roger Hanson lent his friend Frank Mar 
purchased Airlite plane for the weekend.
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very e x t r e m e l y 
1 rnpor tant
3) Frank was a careful pilot and had never been in an 
acc i d e n t .
not a little





4) Just after takeoff, he noticed that the plane’s 













very ext reme1 y 
important
6) However, as Frank was approach i ng the runway, the plane 
was caught by a sudden freak gust of wind that sent it 
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7) Mr. Mars broke his arm and -fractured his skull.
not a little
i rnpor tant
somewhat very extremely 
important
3) He was in the hospital for six weeks and when he got
out he found that he did not have full use of his left 
hand because of the injury and he suffered occasional 
dizzy spells an account of the blow to his head.
not a little
i rnpor tan t
somewhat very extreme 1 y
important
9) Frank Mars was a heavy equipment operator and thus
found himself unable to wor k .
not a little
important
somewhat very extreme 1 y
important




somewhat very extremely 
important
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11) His car was repossessed and he fell behind in
payments to his house.
1 2 3 4 5
not a little somewhat very extreme 1 y
important Important
12) Working part time as a box b o y , the only work he
could g e t , and with his wife working as a secretary, they 
could barely support his five children.
1 2 3 4 5
not a little somewhat very extremely
important important
13) Frank contended that if it were not for the failed 
headlight on the airplane he would not have tried to make 
a landing when he did and thus would not have crashed.
1 2 3 4 5
not a little somewhat very extremely
important important
14) Airlite contended that the cause of the accident was 
the gust of wind.
1 2 3 4 5
not a little somewhat very extremely
important important
15) No structural defect in the aircraft was responsible 
for the accident.
1 2 3 4 5
not a little somewhat very extremely
important important
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16) Airlite -further claimed that their guarantee was
to the purchaser of the aircraft, Roger Hansen, and that 
under state law they had a minimal obligation to Mr. Mars 
who did not actually buy the plane from them. The lawyer 
for Airlite argued that since Mr. Hanson lent the plane, 




little somewhat very extreme 1 y
important
17 ) The lawyer for Mr. Mars argued that although a
manufacturer’s legal obligation was primarily to the 
original buyer, the law was never intended to mean that if 
you we r e n ’t the original buyer, the manufacturer had no 
r esponsi b i1i ty at all. In this case, Mr. Hanson had lent 
Mr. Mars a new plane and had no reason to believe that 




a 1 i tt 1' somewhat very extremely 
important
18) Airlite claimed that Frank Mars should have inspected 
the headlights before he took off.
not a little
important
somewhat very extreme 1 y
important
19) Fr a n k ’s attorney countered that headlight inspection 
was not part of the standard pre-flight check.
not a little
i rnpor tant
somewhat very extreme 1 y
important
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20) Frank M a r s ' attorney argued that the type of headlight 
installed on the model 1200 Airlite, which Frank was 
flying, was a new experimental type of aviation light 
which had a reputation for being unreliable.
o t a little somewhat very ext reme 1 v
important important
21) Mr. M a r s ’ attorney tried to prove that after the 
accident, faulty soldering was found in one of the light 
connect i o n s .
1 2 3 4 5
not a little somewhat very extreme 1 y
important important
22) Expert witnesses also stated that the claim that the 
soldering connections on the headlights had been faulty 
could not be proven, because the plane had been so badly 
damaged in the accident that there was no way anyone could 
tell if the connection had been badly wired by Airlite.
not a little somewhat very extremely
important important
23) A former employee of Airlite was produced as a witness 
who testified that electrical work on Airlite planes was 
often faulty.
not a little somewhat very extremely
important important
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24) The lawyer for the Airlite company, however, brought 
out the fact that the employee who claimed that Airlite 
work was often faulty had been fired from the company for 
drug use and had left making threats to get even.
not 
impor tant
a little somewhat very extremely 
important
25) In defense of Airlite, their lawyer produced
witnesses who testified that the headlights on the model 
1200 were the same as those used on 5 other models of 
small plane and that there had been few problems reported.
not a
impor tant
little somewhat very extremely 
important
26) The attorney for Mr. Mars argued that although
there had not been a large number of failures of the new 
type headlights on the Airlite plane, a sophisticated 
statistical analysis of the failure rate revealed that 




a little somewhat very extremely 
important
27) The Airlite attorneys ridiculed the statistical
analysis of Mr. Mars attorney, saying you could make any 
point you wanted with statistics. He quoted the saying 





little somewhat very extremely 
important
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28) The Airlite attorney -further contended that Mr. 
Hanson, the original owner of the plane, was an 
inexperienced pilot known for his rough landings. He very 
well could have jolted the plane so badly in the week he 
owned it, that he damaged the headlights himself before he 
had lent it to his unfortunate friend.
1 2 3 4 5
not a little somewhat very extreme 1 y
important important
29) The lawyer for Mr. Mars argued that the plane was
barely a week old. Even if there had been some rough 
landings, it surely should have been built to withstand a 
bump or t wo w i t hou t w i r i ng coro i ng 1 oose.
not a little somewhat very extremely
important important
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APPENDIX E
answer the questions below as caretu11 y as you 
answers will be compared to those of actual 
you give is vital to the success 
very much appreciate your
P 1 ease 
can. Your 
jurors. The information 
of the experiment. I 
cooperat i o n .
Below you will find the a li« 
the case you just heard. Below 
also find a rating scale. Please 
piece of evidence was in arriving
it of statements made in 
each statement you will 
rate how important each 
at your verdict.
For instance, if 
deciding the case the 
"1" on the scale.
think a fact 
way you did,
was not important in 
you would circle the
If
arri v i ng 
seale.





1 ft circle the "5" on
i n 
the
For example, if you felt that it was a very important 
piece of i nf orrnat i on in helping you reach your verdict 
that "Frank Mars was a careful pilot," you would rate that 
statement "4." And you would circle the "4" on the scale 
below the statement, just like on the scale below.
i 2 3 ®  5
not a
i rnpor tant
little somewhat very extremely 
important
Thank you for your help.
1) Airlite, guaranteed that it would pay
injury to the buyer of one of its planes which 
from the operation of an Airlite 
for the damage was the negligence








little somewhat very extremely important
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2) Roger Hanson lent his -friend Frank Mars his newly 
purchased Airlite plane for the weekend.
not a little 
important
somewhat very ext reme1 y 
i rnportant
3) Just after takeoff, he noticed that 
headlights did not appear to be working. the plane’s
1 2 3 4 5
not a little 
i rnpor tant
somewhat very extremely 
i rnportant
4) He decided to turn 
repai r e d .
back to the airport and have them
1 2 3 4 5




5) However, as Frank was approach i ng the runway, the plane 
was caught by a sudden gust of wind that sent it crashing 
into the ground.
1 2 3 4 5




6) Mr. Mars broke his arm and fractured his sku1 1.
1 2 3 4 5
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7) He was in the hospital for six weeks and when he got 
out he found that he did not have full use of his left 
hand because of the injury and he suffered occasional 
dizzy spells an account of the blow to his head.
1 2 3 4 5
not a little somewhat very extremely
important important
3) Frank Mars was a heavy equipment operator and thus
found himself unable to work.
1 2 3 4 5
not a little somewhat very extremely
important important
9) Frank contended that if it were not for the failed 
headlight on the airplane he would not have tried to make 
a landing when he did and thus would not have crashed.
1 2 3 4 5
not a little somewhat very extremely
important important
10) Airlite contended that the cause of the accident was 
the gust of wind.
1 2 3 4 5
not a little somewhat very extreme 1 y
important important
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12) Airlite further claimed that their guarantee was
to the purchaser of the aircraft, Roger Hansen, and that 
under state law they had little obligation to Mr. Mars who 
did not actually buy the plane from them. The lawyer for 
Airlite argued that since Mr. Hanson lent the plane, it 
was his respons i b i1i ty if the plane was defective.
not a
important
little somewhat very extreme 1 y
important
13) The lawyer for Mr. Mars argued that although a 
manufacturer's legal obligation was primarily to the 
original buyer, the law was never intended to mean that if 
you w e r e n ’t the original buyer, the manufacturer had no 
responsibility at all. In this case, Mr. Hanson had lent 
Mr. Mars a new plane and had no reason to believe that 
there was a defect. Therefore he had no responsibi1i ty.
not
important
a little somewhat very extremely 
important
1 4 ) The lawyer for Frank Mars produced an expert
witness who testified that faulty soldering was found in
one of the 
acc i den t .
light connections of the plane after the
not a little
important
somewhat very extreme 1 y
important
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15) A former employee of Airlite also testified that the 
electrical work on Airlite planes was often faulty.
1 2 3 4 5
not a little somewhat very extremely
important important
16) The lawyer for the Airlite company, however,
brought out the fact that the employee who claimed that
Airlite work was often faulty had been fired from the
company for drug use and might be trying to get even.
not a little somewhat very extremely
important important
17)Airlite also produced expert witnesses of its own who 
testified that the plane was so badly damaged in the 
accident that it was difficult to tell if the light 
connection had been badly wired by Airlite.
not a little somewhat very extremely
important important
*** Thank you for your participation. ***
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APPENDIX F
Please indicate on a scale + rom 1 to 5, how certain you 
are that the verdict you reached is the correct one. 
Circle the response that seems the most true of how 
confident you are about your decision.
1 2 3 4 5
Not very Somewhat Extremely
Confident Confident Confident
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APPENDIX G 
Structured Group - Unstructured Group
Structured Unstructured (Pooled SD) F (1,16)Mean (SD) Mean (SD)Ir 2. 58 (.40) 2.64 (.59) ( . 50) . 05R 3.46 (.26) 3. 47 ( . 44) ( . 36) . 01Ir/R .76 (.10) . 78 ( . 14) ( . 12) . 05
D 3.11 (.30) 2.85 (.47) ( . 39) 1 . 92D- 3.03 ( . 35) 2.83 ( . 59) ( . 48) . 74D + 3. 20 (.58) 2.88 (.48) ( . 53) 1.63
C 3.52 (.35) 3.69 ( .29) (.31) 1. 28C- 3. 73 ( . 18) 3. 88 ( . 24) (.21) 2.29C + 3.31 (.64) 3. 50 ( .39) ( . 53) .60
L 3. 69 (.49) 3. 72 (.51) (.50) . 02L- 3.96 ( . 60) 4.05 ( . 46) (.53) . 13L + 3.41 ( . 62) 3. 38 ( . 70) ( . 66 ) . 01
I r= average of the scores measuring the importance of
irrelevant evidence (evidence concerning the seriousnessof Mr. M a r s ’ i nj ur i es and the extent of his f 1nancial1osses).
R= average of the evaluations of the irnpor tance of all
other case evidence.
Ir/R= the ratio between the two above measures.
D= all evidence regarding whether there was a defect in
the plane. D= (D- + D+) /2.
D- = a l 1 e v i d e n c e  a g a i n s t  the e x i s t e n c e  of a defect.
D+= all evidence supporting the existence of a defect
C= all evidence germane to the question of whether a
possible defect caused the accident. C= (C- + C+)/2
C- = all evidence against the proposition that a defect in
the plane caused the accident.
C+ = a l 1 evidence supporting the claim that a defect 
the plane caused the accident.
i n
L -  all evidence concerning whether the defendant has any 
legal responsibility to the plaintiff, given that he was
not the purchaser of the aircraft. L= (L- + L+)/2
L- = all evidence against the existence of a legal
obligation of the manufacturer.
L+ = all evidence supporting the existence of a legal
1iabi1ity.
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U n s t r u c t u r e d  Group -
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Short Group
Unstrue tured Short (Pooled SD) F (1,16)
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Ir 2. 64 (.59) 2. 49 (.59) ( . 59) .27R 3. 47 (.44) 3. 41 ( . 30) (. 37) . 11Ir/R .78 ( . 14) . 73 (. 15) (. 14) . 19
D 2. 85 ( . 47) 2.80 (. 35) (.41) -07D- 2. 83 (.59) 3. 05 (.20) ( . 44) 1.11D + 2. 88 ( . 48) 2. 55 (.61) (.54) 1. 57
C 3. 69 (.29) 3 » 86 (.20) (.24) 2.28
c - 3. 38 ( . 24) 4. 67 (.21) ( . 23) 55.07*C + 3.50 ( . 39) 3.06 ( . 57) (.49) 3.68
L 3.72 (.51) 3.04 ( . 46) ( . 48) 5. 89*
L - 4.05 (.46) 2.98 (.60) (.54) 17.93*L + 3. 38 (.70) 3. 09 ( . 90) (.81) . 61
I r = average of t he scores measuring the importance of
irrelevant evidence (evidence concerning the seriousnessof Mr. M a r s ’ injuries and the extent of his financial
1osses).
R= average of the evaluations of the importance 
other case evidence.
of all
Ir/R= the ratio between the two above measures.
D= all evidence regarding whether there was a defect in 
the plane. D= (D- + D+) /2.
D- = all evidence against the existence of a defect.
D+= all evidence supporting the existence of a defect.
C= all evidence germane to the question of whether a 
possible defect caused the accident. C= (C- + C+)/2 
C- = all evidence against the proposition that a defect in 
the plane caused the accident.
C+ = all evidence supporting the claim that a defect in 
the plane caused the accident.
L= all evidence concerning whether the defendant has any 
legal responsibility to the plaintiff, given that he was 
not the purchaser of the aircraft. L= (L- + L+)/2 
L- = all evidence against the existence of a legal 
obligation of the manufacturer.
1_+ = all evidence supporting the existence of a legal
1iabi1 i t y .
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APPENDIX I 
Structured Group- Short Group
Structured Short (Pooled SD) F
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Ir 2.53 (.40) 2.49 (.59) ( . 50) . 14R 3.46 ( . 26) 3. 41 (. 30) ( . 28) . 13Ir/R .76 ( . 10) . 73 (. 15) ( . 13) . 09
D 3.11 ( . 30) 2. SO (.35) (.32) 4.02D- 3.03 (.35) 3. 05 (.20) (.29) . 03D+ 3.20 (.58) 2.55 (.61) ( . 60) 5.27*
C 3.52 (.35) 3. 86 (.20) (.29) 6.62*C- 3.73 (. IS) 4. 67 (.21) (. 20) 103.35*C+ 3.31 ( . 64) 3.06 (.57) (.60) . 77
L 3.69 (.61) 3. 04 (.72) ( . 65) 5.53*L- 3.96 (.60) 2.97 ( . 60) (.60) 11.92*L+ 3.41 (.62) 3. 09 (.90) ( . 77) . 81
Ir= average of the scores measuring the importance of
irrelevant evidence (evidence concerning the seriousness
of Mr. Mars 
losses).
’ injuries and the extent of his f i nanci al
R= average of the evaluations of the 
other case evidence.
importance of all
Ir/R= the ratio between the two above measures.
D= all evidence regarding whether there was a defect in 
the plane. D= (D- + D+) /2.
D- = all evidence against the existence of a 
D+= all evidence supporting the existence of
defect. 
a defect.
C= all evidence germane to the question of 
possible defect caused the accident. C= (C- + 
C- = all evidence against the proposition that 
the plane caused the accident.
C+ = a l 1 evidence supporting the claim that a 
the plane caused the accident.
whether 
C+) /2 
a defect i n
defect in
L= all evidence concerning whether the defendant has any 
legal responsibility to the plaintiff, given that he was 
not the purchaser of the aircraft.
L- = all evidence against the 
obligation of the manufacturer.
L+ = all evidence supporting the existence 
liability.
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